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Abstract
We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who
use advertising campaigns to compete for a dominant share of the market for a certain good. Each
firm chooses one of three possible strategies for running its advertising campaign. The two rival
firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if a firm expects
to capture dominant market share with probability  then its payoff in the game we study is
also  Our analysis leads to four results. First, we provide the normal form representation of the
game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer. Second, we specify the game in
matrix form. Third, we indicate what happens at each stage of the elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. Finally, we show that the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields a
clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game. 
Keywords: Advertising, Duopoly, New Good Producer, Remanufacturer, Dominated Strategy
JEL Codes: M37, L21, D21
4A new good producer is also frequently referred to as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Therefore, in the remainder of
this paper, we shall use these two terms interchangeably. 
5
Go to https://www3.epa.gov/epawaste/conserve/tools/cpg/index.htm for additional details. Accessed on April 12, 2016. 
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1. Introduction
The term remanufacturing refers to the rebuilding, the repairing, and the restoration of a
product or equipment to meet or exceed a new good producer’s4 performance specifications.
Remanufactured products are often sold and serviced by third-parties and the remanufactured
products themselves typically carry a warranty that is different from the one provided by the new
good producer. 
There are essentially two reasons that account for the importance of remanufacturing in the
United States today. First, in an attempt to regulate injurious environmental outcomes, in 1995, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implemented the “Comprehensive Procurement
Guideline.” This guideline sought to cut waste and encourage resource conservation by making sure
that materials collected in recycling programs would be used again to manufacture new products.5
Second, there are the actual cost savings experienced by firms. In this regard, Mitra and Webster
(2008) note that in 1996, Ford was able to avoid the disposal of more than 67,700 pounds of toner
cartridges and thus saved $180,000 in disposal costs. Given the growing importance of
remanufacturing from environmental and practical standpoints, a growing literature has now begun
to examine the properties of this industrial process. We now briefly survey this literature. 
First consider the perspective of firms. Lebreton and Tuma (2006) analyze remanufacturing
in the context of the disposal of 600,000 tons of used tires in Germany and they point to particular
factors that are likely to raise remanufacturing rates in this country. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006)
4study the competition between an OEM and an independent operator (IO). They show that when the
threat of competition increases, the OEM is more likely to fully utilize all available cores and offer
the remanufactured product itself and at a lower price.
New and remanufactured goods are often sold in the same market and therefore it makes
sense to consider them together in the design of a product line. Aydin et al. (2015) adopt this point
of view and set forth a new methodology that permits them to compute the maximum profit and the
market share associated with a product line. Shi et al. (2015) study the stability of the Nash
equilibrium in the game between an OEM and a remanufacturer. They show that a higher
willingness-to-pay (WTP) on the part of consumers can either fortify or weaken the stability of the
relevant Nash equilibrium. Finally, Batabyal and Beladi (2016a) have analyzed the strategic
interaction between an OEM and a remanufacturer when the aim of both firms is to use expenditures
on product development to capture a dominant share of the market in which they are operating. 
Now consider remanufacturing from the perspective of consumers. The relevance of this
perspective stems from the fact that like firms, consumers can also affect the market shares obtained
by an OEM and a remanufacturer through their purchases of one or the other kind of good. Batabyal
and Beladi (2016b) is the only paper to conduct a game-theoretic analysis of the strategic interaction
between two types of consumers who seek to raise the market share of either new or remanufactured
toner cartridges. These researchers point out that one way to extend the analysis in their paper would
be to analyze a game in which the firms that produce the new and the remanufactured goods are able
to influence consumer preferences by advertising the relative strengths of their goods. 
Researchers such as Giuntini and Gaudette (2003) and Hong et al. (2015) have recognized
the importance of advertising in making consumers aware of the properties of new and
5remanufactured goods. Even so, Batabyal and Beladi (2016c) is the only paper to formally study the
effect that negative advertising has on the relative market shares of a new good producer and a
remanufacturer. We generalize the analysis in Batabyal and Beladi (2016c) by studying not just
negative advertising but the advertising campaigns of an OEM and a remanufacturer where negative
advertising is one of three possible strategies the two rival firms use to compete for a dominant share
of the market for a certain good such as a toner cartridge. 
Section 2.1 describes the static game of complete information model—see Tadelis (2013,
pp. 43-126) for details—of the interaction between an OEM and a remanufacturer who use
advertising campaigns to compete for a dominant share of the market for a certain good (toner
cartridge). Each firm chooses one of three possible strategies for running its advertising campaign.
If a firm expects to capture dominant market share with probability  then its payoff in the
game is also  Section 2.2 provides the normal form representation of the game. Section 2.3
specifies the game in matrix form. Section 2.4 indicates what happens at each stage of the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Section 2.5 shows that the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of our advertising game.
Finally, section 3 concludes and then discusses two ways in which this paper’s research might be
extended.
2. Analysis
2.1. The theoretical framework
Consider a particular market in which a new good producer (firm 1) and a remanufacturer
(firm 2) produce toner cartridges for sale to consumers. Note that our subsequent analysis does not
depend in any way on the numbering of the two rival firms or on the specific good we have chosen
6to concentrate on. Each one of the two firms under consideration has one of three choices in running
its advertising campaign. First, it can choose to focus exclusively on the positive aspects of its own
product. This is the positive advertising campaign which we denote by  Second, a firm can
choose to focus on the positive aspects of its own product and attack one’s rival’s product. This is
the balanced advertising campaign and it is denoted by  Finally, a firm can focus solely on
attacking one’s rival’s product. This is the negative advertising campaign and we denote this by 
We suppose that all the OEM and the remanufacturer care about is the probability of
capturing a dominant—greater than 50 percent—share of the market for toner cartridges As such,
if a firm expects to capture dominant market share with probability  then its payoff is simply 
The probability that either firm will capture a dominant share of the market for toner cartridges
depends not only on its own advertising campaign strategy but also on its rival’s strategy. 
The probabilities of capturing a dominant share of the market for toner cartridges are as
follows. If both firms use the same advertising campaign strategy then each captures dominant
market share with probability  If firm  uses the positive strategy  but firm  uses the
balanced strategy  then firm  does not capture dominant market share with certainty. If firm 
uses the positive strategy  but firm  uses the negative strategy  then firm  captures
dominant market share with probability  Finally, if firm  uses the negative strategy  but firm
 uses the balanced strategy  then firm  captures dominant market share with probability 
With this background in place, our next task is to provide the normal form representation of the
static game between the two rival firms with the features delineated in this and the preceding two
6We use specific numerical values for the various “capture probabilities” primarily to show how the process of iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies—which builds on the assumption of the common knowledge of rationality—works in the context of
the advertising game that we are studying here. Without the use of such explicit numerical values, it would be impossible to solve
the underlying game of interest. Having said this, it should be clear to the reader that an analysis of the sort that we are conducting
here can be conducted for any numerical values of the capture probabilities. 
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paragraphs.6 
2.2. The game in normal form
We need to stipulate the number of players, their strategy spaces, and their payoff functions.
Clearly, there are two firms or players  Each firm  has three strategies given by
 Finally, the payoff to firm  is given by the function  Using the
capture probabilities specified in the last paragraph of section 2.1, the various payoffs to the two
rival firms can be written explicitly. We get
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
and
(7)
Let us now specify the advertising game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer in
8matrix form. 
2.3. The game in matrix form
Using equations (1) through (7), we get
Firm 1 (OEM)
Firm 2 (Remanufacturer)
 (Positive)  (Balanced)  (Negative)
 (Positive) 0.5, 0.5 0, 1 0.3, 0.7
 (Balanced) 1, 0 0.5, 0.5 0.4, 0.6
 (Negative) 0.7, 0.3 0.6, 0.4 0.5, 0.5
Figure 1
Now, as a prelude to solving the advertising game depicted in figure 1, let us first ascertain what
happens at each stage of the elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 
2.4. Elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Inspecting the above game in matrix form, we see that for both the firms seeking to capture
a dominant share of the market for toner cartridges, the balanced advertising strategy  strictly
dominates the positive advertising strategy  Therefore, we can eliminate the strategy  from
any further consideration. This leaves us with the following 2x2 game 
Firm 1 (OEM)
Firm 2 (Remanufacturer)
 (Balanced)  (Negative)
 (Balanced) 0.5, 0.5 0.4, 0.6
 (Negative) 0.6, 0.4 0.5, 0.5
Figure 2
Our next task is to solve the 2x2 game depicted in matrix form in figure 2.
92.5. The solution
Inspecting the above game, it is clear that the negative advertising strategy  strictly
dominates the balanced strategy  for both the firms. Therefore, the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies leads to a clear prediction about the outcome of this advertising game. In
particular, the solution to the game is that the OEM and the remanufacturer will engage in negative
advertising campaigns in their quest to capture a dominant share of the market for toner cartridges.
Equation (1) tells us that for either firm, the likelihood of capturing a dominant share of the market
for toner cartridges with a negative advertising campaign is one-half. This completes our analysis
of advertising and the competition for dominant market share between an OEM and a
remanufacturer.
3. Conclusions
In this paper we studied the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a
remanufacturer who used advertising campaigns to compete for a dominant share of the market for
toner cartridges. Each firm chose one of three possible strategies for running its advertising
campaign. The two rival firms cared only about acquiring a dominant share of the relevant market.
Hence, if a firm expected to capture dominant market share with probability  then its payoff
in the game we studied was also  Our analysis led to four results. First, we provided the normal
form representation of the game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer. Second,
we specified the same game in matrix form. Third, we indicated what happened at each stage of the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we showed that the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies yielded a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the
advertising game. 
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The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what
follows, we suggest two possible extensions. First, it would be useful to analyze the strategic
competition between a new good producer and a remanufacturer in a repeated game in which the
two firms interact with each other on multiple occasions over time. Second, it would also be
informative to study the efficacy of advertising as a market share enhancing device when an OEM
and a remanufacturer have access to other such devices including, but not limited to, price reductions
from membership in loyalty programs and volume purchase discounts. Studies that analyze these
aspects of the underlying problem will provide further insights into the functioning of markets with
remanufacturing and the ways in which such markets can efficiently enhance the conservation of
scarce resources. 
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